

# **The role of environmental goods and services firms in the uptake of environmental technology: Evidence from the London Taxi Emissions program**

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# Environmental goods and services (EGS) firms

Firms that make, improve, market and/or sell a product or service to another, typically non-compliant polluting firm for the purpose of achieving compliance with legally binding environmental regulations

EGS firms are definitely not

- Firms doing corporate environmental responsibility
- Resource efficient firms

Policies: WTO, OECD countries, UK, numerous regions.

# Environmental protection domains (CEPA)

1. Air and climate
2. Wastewater
3. Waste
4. Soil, groundwater, surface water
5. Noise and biodiversity
6. Biodiversity and landscape
7. Radiation
8. Environmental R&D
9. Other

# EGS sector firms in UK and Europe

	<b>UK</b>	<b>EU</b>
<b>Total turnover</b>	€31-53 billion	€227 billion
<b>Total firms</b>	17,000	144,500
<b>Total employment</b>	400,000	3.4 million
<b>EGS as a % of GDP</b>	1.25%	2.3%

DTI (2005) and European Commission DG Environment (2006)

# Today

Looking today at the effects of supplier firms on the uptake of environmental technology by polluting firms

EGS firms:

- a) reduce technical and regulatory uncertainty for polluters
- b) compress costs through learning and specialisation
- c) adapt technologies to new regulatory contexts which leads to incremental innovations

# Theoretical context (1)

## ‘who adopts’ studies

- Ordinary innovation diffusion studies: early adopting firms larger, more educated workforces, spatially concentrated, homogenous, technologically savvy (Rogers 1995)
- Uptake depends on information: personal or impersonal information source; advancement of soft (instructions) knowledge alongside hard (technical) knowledge (Geroski 2000)

# Theoretical context (2)

## environmental technology (ET) diffusion

Little explicit treatment of supplier effects

- Equipment to control NO<sub>x</sub> and SO<sub>2</sub> (Popp 2005)
- Equipment for radioactive waste disposal (Lanjouw and Mody 1996)
- Phase down of lead in gasoline (Jaffe, Newell and Stavins 2002)

Some speculation on responses to policy instruments but no empirics

- Impact of environmental policy instruments on likelihood of polluters to invest in R&D internally (Magat 1978)
- and to other firms (Milliman and Prince 1998)

# Theoretical context (3)

## effects of supplier firms

- Suppliers' continuous learning causes costs and prices for durables to fall continuously (linearly) over adoption period, while uptake is initially weak, then strong, then weak (a sigmoid curve) (Bass 1980)
- Competitive effects *between* supplier firms affect uptake (Gatignon and Robertson 1989)
- Before making statements about collective uptake patterns (diffusion) it makes sense to look empirically at factors affecting uptake of ET by individual firms.




# Role of EGS firms: hypotheses

- $H_0$ : Polluting firms face the same adoption costs regardless of the influence of EGS firms; binding regulations are the real cause of uptake, not EGS firms.
- $H_1$ : EGS firms reduce technical and regulatory uncertainty for polluters
- $H_2$ : Learning and specialisation from repeat installations lowers abatement costs
- $H_3$ : Technology adaptation to regulatory conditions leads to incremental innovations

# H<sub>1</sub> – H<sub>3</sub> in Schumpeter's innovation process

## EGS firms in the uptake of environmental technology



# Case study design

- Study successful when . . . .
- 18 public notices published by Public Carriage Office (PCO), 2004-2008
- 3 expert interviews
  - Supplier and distributor of vehicle emissions control equipment
  - Civil servant working on EGS policy for 5 years in DTI/BERR
  - Technology accreditation manager, Energy Saving Trust

# London Taxi Emissions program (1)

- Vehicular traffic responsible for 67.9% of PM10 and NOx in the capital; old, heavy, diesel vehicles especially
- About 21,000 taxis providing 85 million trips per year, primarily in central London and around Heathrow. Fleet exhaust emissions account for ~23% of all PM10 emissions and ~7% of all NOx emissions in central London in 2002.
- European Vehicle Emissions Standards ('Euro Standards')

# London Taxi Emissions Program (2)

- Revenue neutral for vehicle owners
- Policy options
  - Vehicle replacement (£30,000)
  - Engine conversion to LPG (£5,000)
  - Fit abatement equipment (diesel particulate filters, exhaust gas recirculation equipment or diesel oxidation catalysts) (£2,500)

# **H<sub>1</sub>: EGS firms reduce technical and regulatory uncertainty for polluters**

- Little late contact with vehicle owners (polluters) in marketing/sales/distribution stage but extensive collaboration with vehicle owners in early equipment design stage
- Supplier/distributor played ‘technical advisor’ to then-Mayor of London for ‘at least 5 years’ in run up to compliance date (from 2003). Uncertainty reduced for *policymakers*.

## **H<sub>2</sub>: Learning and specialisation from repeat installations lowers abatement costs**

- Iterative learning seemed to occur in government durability testing of candidate abatement equipment, not by the EGS firm's introduction of successive models
- Some evidence of influencing the policy requirement to suit the technological capability, not vice versa: EIC lobbies for definitions and 'technology champion' in EA.

# H<sub>3</sub>: Technology adaptations lead to incremental innovations

- Specifically for TEP market, distributor/supplier of exhaust treatment equipment combined two technologies – diesel particulate filter (DPF) and an exhaust gas recirculation (EGR) system. ‘Better NO<sub>x</sub> control than anything on the UK’.
- Adaptations seem to have occurred in early consultation with vehicle owners, and in pre-market durability testing by government laboratories. No evidence they occurred in market-based cycles of adapt → sell → feedback → adapt.



# Conclusions (substantive, theoretical)

- Limited evidence, small scale, short time frame, but:
  - $H_1$  (uncertainty): supported, but reduced in different ways and for different audiences than expected
  - $H_2$  (learning and specialisation): evidence to support (owner consultation, laboratory testing) and reject (EIC).
  - $H_3$  (incremental innovations): strongly supported
- EGS firms impact on uptake and diffusion
  - Supplier technical expertise an ‘active ingredient’
  - Government approval mediates technological innovations
  - Costs lowered through collaborative effects (2 types) more than competitive effects

# Conclusions (case study design)

- Interviewee ‘steers’ are dangerous
- Evidence supported multiple hypotheses; from ‘identify effects’ stage to ‘quantify effects’ stage
- Mandatory regulations cloud the effects of EGS firms
  - Multiple case studies to ‘control’ for regulatory effects
  - Either across urban centres (US, UK, Sweden)
  - Or across environmental domains (air, water, soil) in UK

# Thanks for your time

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